摘 要:本文以传统公共产品理论和奥尔森集体行动理论为基础，分析了莱茵河在治理过程中出现的反差。所得出的结论依次有：（1）由公共产品的非排他性引发的搭便车问题将导致公共产品得不到有效的供给，这也是莱茵河在80年代前治理不成功的原因；（2）集体物品最优供给的必要条件是一个集团必须是很小的，或能够强制它的成员，或能够为它的贡献者提供充分的选择性激励。集团规模、份额、组织成本、可见性、强制或压迫以及选择性激励是影响集体行动的主要因素。制度安排能够保证国际公共产品的有效供给。在80年代的治理过程中，ICPR最大限度地协调了沿岸各国的行动，从而很好地避免了搭便车。莱茵河的成功治理成为欧洲环保史上的伟大成就之一，为我国长江黄河的治理提供了很好的借鉴。

关键词：国际公共产品，有效供给，搭便车，集体行动

Abstract:This article is based on traditional public goods theory and Olson's collective action theory, analyzing the contrast which emerged in the protection of Rhine. The conclusions are as follows: (1) The free-rider problem triggered by non-exclusiveness of public goods will result in the low efficient supply. This is also the reason why Rhine cannot be successfully dealt with before the 1980s; (2) A necessary condition for optimal collective goods provision -- a group must be small or able to coerce its members or able to provide sufficient selective incentives to contributors. Group size, shares, organizational cost, noticeability, coercion or pressure and selective incentives are the main factors affecting collective action. System arrangements can ensure efficient supply of International public goods. During the late 1980s, ICPR coordinated the action of the countries along Rhine at a maximum, thus avoiding free-rider problem. The successful measurement of Rhine has been one of the greatest achievements in the history of environment protection in Europe, setting a good example for the protection of Changjiang River and Yellow River.

Key words: International public goods, efficient supply, free-rider, collective action